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LEADERS AND LAGGARDS:  TACKLING 
STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE 
YOUTH SPORTS CONCUSSION EPIDEMIC 
Chris Lau* 
 
In 2009, state legislatures began to enact concussion safety laws to protect 
youth athletes suffering from traumatic brain injuries sustained during the 
course of play.  By 2014, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had 
enacted some form of youth sports concussion legislation.  Yet these statutes 
vary widely across states in terms of the protections offered to youth athletes.  
This Note provides an analysis of state legislation by classifying all fifty-one 
statutes among distinct tiers ranging from least to most protective. 
These laws have generally targeted the secondary risks of concussions, 
which emerge after a youth athlete has suffered a traumatic brain injury.  
While the prevention of secondary risks is an important element of 
concussion management, future legislators should also consider the primary 
risks of concussions by focusing on reducing the risk of injury before it 
occurs.  This Note advocates that, to ensure the adequate protection of all 
youth athletes, future legislators must continue to prevent secondary risks by 
expanding coverage and strengthening enforcement mechanisms.  In 
addition, legislators must address the primary risks of concussions by 
mandating certain rule changes, which, over time, may begin to transform 
societal attitudes toward the seriousness of sports-related concussions.  
While many youth sports organizations and even professional sports leagues 
have begun to implement certain rule changes to increase player safety, these 
changes would gain greater efficacy if backed by the force of law.  This Note 
lays out recommendations for a model statute to provide guidance for future 
legislators. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October of 2006, Zackery Lystedt was thirteen years old and a gifted 
athlete who played on his junior high school football team.1  During a game, 
Zackery struck the ground headfirst after tackling an opponent.2  A video of 
the game shows Zackery lying on the ground with his hands clutching both 
sides of his helmet.3  Despite the injury, Zackery was allowed back into the 
game just fifteen minutes later.4 
Late in the second half of the game, Zackery collapsed on the field and 
was airlifted to a nearby hospital.5  Doctors removed parts of his skull to 
relieve pressure from his hemorrhaging brain.6  Zackery spent the next three 
months in a coma.7  It took nine months before he could speak his first word, 
thirteen months before he could move a limb, and almost two years before he 
could eat without the assistance of a feeding tube.8 
In May of 2009, the Washington State Legislature enacted the Zackery 
Lystedt Law9 (“the Lystedt Law”), the nation’s first comprehensive youth 
sports concussion safety act.10  The statute required any youth athlete 
showing signs of a concussion to be examined and cleared by a licensed 
health-care provider before being permitted to return to play.11  Today, over 
ten years after his injury, Zackery has embraced his eponymous role as the 
face of youth sports concussion legislation; however, he walks with a limp, 
wears thick glasses specially designed to aid his peripheral vision, and 
struggles to remember his daily schedule.12  Had the Washington law been 
in place in October of 2006, it is likely that Zackery would not have been 
permitted to reenter the game; his life-altering injury may have been 
avoided.13 
 
 1. See The Lystedt Law:  A Concussion Survivor’s Journey, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter The Lystedt Law], http://www.cdc.gov/ 
media/subtopic/matte/pdf/031210-Zack-story.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L7S-4XYN]. 
 2. See Sheila Mickool, Taking Brain Injuries out of Sports, SEATTLE MAG. (Apr. 9, 
2013), http://www.seattlemag.com/article/taking-brain-injuries-out-sports [https://perma.cc/ 
FER4-BJ62]. 
 3. See The Lystedt Law, supra note 1. 
 4. See Chantal Anderson, State Lawmakers Approve Concussion Bills for Young 
Athletes, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/ 
politics/state-lawmakers-approve-concussion-bills-for-young-athletes [https://perma.cc/46P 
W-78Z5]. 
 5. See The Lystedt Law, supra note 1. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190 (2009). 
 10. See Mickool, supra note 2. 
 11. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190. 
 12. See Patricia Guthrie, Ex Youth Football Player:  You Could End Up Like Me, WEBMD 
(Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.webmd.com/brain/news/20151021/concussion-zack-lystedt 
[https://perma.cc/2QWM-2FVW]. 
 13. See id. 
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Still, there is no guarantee that the law would have prevented Zackery’s 
injury.14  The “macho culture” that has persisted in sports for decades has, at 
least in part, weakened the application of the law and, thus, its 
effectiveness.15  While state legislation has helped to increase awareness of 
this public health issue,16 there remains a “culture of resistance” in terms of 
reporting injuries within both youth and professional sports.17  Moreover, 
even where the laws of different states are virtually identical, there is 
tremendous variation in enforcement.18 
This Note examines the disparities among state legislation and analyzes 
whether such legislation alone is sufficient to quell the “concussion 
epidemic.”19  While many states have adopted ample precautions to protect 
children like Zackery and the millions of other youth athletes that are put at 
risk each year,20 others provide inadequate safeguards.  Part I of this Note 
provides background information necessary to understand the stakes of this 
legislation by exploring the long-term effects of traumatic brain injury (TBI) 
and the broad spectrum of protections offered across different states.  Then, 
Part II classifies where certain state statutes lie along this spectrum, analyzes 
the strengths and weaknesses of state legislation, examines enforcement 
mechanisms, and assesses the actions taken by the federal government.  
Finally, Part III recommends provisions for an updated model code and 
proposes an increased emphasis on primary prevention. 
I.  YOUTH SPORTS CONCUSSIONS 
AND STATE LEGISLATION:  AN OVERVIEW 
Before assessing the effectiveness of existing legislation, it is necessary to 
understand the two key issues at hand:  (1) the lasting impact of a TBI and 
 
 14. See, e.g., Hosea H. Harvey, Refereeing the Public Health, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y 
L. & ETHICS 66, 113–14 (2014); Marie-France Wilson, Youth Athletes at Risk:  Preventing and 
Managing Consequences of Sports Concussions in Young Athletes and the Related Legal 
Issues, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 241, 288 (2010) (noting that existing state legislation “may 
not go far enough”). 
 15. See LINDA CARROLL & DAVID ROSNER, THE CONCUSSION CRISIS:  ANATOMY OF A 
SILENT EPIDEMIC 35–67 (2011) (discussing the “macho culture” that exists in football, even at 
the youth level). 
 16. See infra notes 44 and 217 and accompanying text. 
 17. See COMM. ON SPORTS-RELATED CONCUSSIONS IN YOUTH, INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RES. 
COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADS., SPORTS-RELATED CONCUSSIONS IN YOUTH:  IMPROVING THE SCIENCE, 
CHANGING THE CULTURE 7, 43–44 (Robert Graham et al. eds., 2014), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK169016/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK169016.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9NWC-S7XT]. 
 18. Kerri McGowan Lowrey & Stephanie R. Morain, State Experiences Implementing 
Youth Sports Concussion Laws:  Challenges, Successes, and Lessons for Evaluating Impact, 
42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 294 (2014). 
 19. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MILD 
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES:  STEPS TO PREVENT A SERIOUS PUBLIC 
HEALTH PROBLEM (2003) [hereinafter CDC, 2003 REPORT], http://www.cdc.gov/ 
traumaticbraininjury/pdf/mtbireport-a.pdf (“Traumatic brain injury is frequently referred to as 
the silent epidemic because the problems that result from it (e.g., impaired memory) often are 
not visible.”) [https://perma.cc/SH7Q-H8G8]. 
 20. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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(2) the current laws in place to limit such effects.  Part I.A provides an 
overview of concussions and the consequencesespecially among 
childrenthat can result from missed diagnoses.  Next, Part I.B discusses the 
arc of state legislative responses.  Then, Part I.C analyzes Washington State’s 
Lystedt Law and evaluates the laws of other states using the Lystedt Law as 
a benchmark. 
A.  Concussions:  Definitions, Diagnoses, and Scope 
To evaluate the role that legislation should play within the concussion 
epidemic, it is useful to examine the types of TBI that such legislation is 
designed to address.  A TBI is defined by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) as “an injury that disrupts the normal function of the 
brain.”21  It can be caused by a bump, blow, or jolt to the head or a penetrating 
head injury.22  TBIs range from mild to severe.23  A mild TBI is characterized 
by any period of transient confusion, disorientation, or impaired 
consciousness, dysfunction of memory around the time of injury, or loss of 
consciousness lasting less than thirty minutes.24  Severe TBIs involve 
extended periods of unconsciousness lasting longer than thirty minutes, 
posttraumatic amnesia lasting longer than twenty-four hours, or penetrating 
skull injury.25 
Concussions are classified as a type of mild TBI because they are not 
usually life threatening.26  While a single concussion will typically not cause 
death, suffering repeated concussions increases the risk of second impact 
syndrome, a potentially fatal condition that occurs when a second concussion 
is sustained before the symptoms of the first concussion have cleared.27  One 
severe effect of second impact syndrome is chronic traumatic encephalopathy 
(CTE).28  CTE is a progressive degenerative disease of the brain, common in 
 
 21. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TRAUMATIC 
BRAIN INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES:  EPIDEMIOLOGY AND REHABILITATION (2015) 
[hereinafter CDC, 2015 REPORT], http://www.cdc.gov/traumaticbraininjury/pdf/tbi_report_ 
to_congress_epi_and_rehab-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ65-DDJP]. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See CDC, 2003 REPORT, supra note 19. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GET A HEADS UP ON CONCUSSIONS IN 
SPORTS POLICIES:  INFORMATION FOR PARENTS, COACHES, AND SCHOOL & SPORTS 
PROFESSIONALS (2013) [hereinafter CDC, HEADS UP], http://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/ 
policy/headsuponconcussioninsportspolicies-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/LTN7-BFAA]; What Is a 
Concussion?, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/headsup/ 
basics/concussion_whatis.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2017) [https://perma.cc/DN7S-N5PK]. 
 27. See Scott D. Bender et al., Historical Perspectives, in TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN 
SPORTS:  AN INTERNATIONAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 11 (Mark R. Lovell et al. 
eds., 2004). 
 28. See Ann C. McKee et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in Athletes:  
Progressive Tauopathy After Repetitive Head Injury, 68 J. NEUROPATHOLOGY & 
EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 709, 709 (2009). 
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individuals who have suffered multiple TBIs.29  CTE symptoms generally 
begin with memory loss, followed by progressive deterioration, often leading 
to dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, or parkinsonism.30 
In light of CTE’s severe consequences, it is especially important to 
recognize concussion symptoms among youth athletes, whose age and 
continuing neurological development render them more susceptible to 
concussions with longer recovery times.31  The brains of adolescent children 
are still undergoing neurological reorganization.32  For example, in 
adolescents, the frontal lobean area of the brain that is particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of concussionsis especially fragile because it 
develops in spurts.33  Given that the frontal regions of the brain are 
responsible for decision making and information management,34 early 
diagnosis in young athletes is incredibly valuable. 
Yet identifying a sports-related concussion is one of the most difficult 
tasks for sports medicine professionals because there is no biological marker 
for an accurate diagnosis.35  Symptoms of concussions generally include 
confusion, headache, lack of balance, dizziness, and disorientation.36  These 
latent symptoms are often easier to overlook than more outwardly visible 
signs, such as nausea, vomiting, or sensitivity to noise or light.37  This issue 
is exacerbated by the tendency of young athletes to underreport signs of 
concussions, so that, among other reasons, they can return to play more 
quickly.38 
The scope of this issue is extensive:  the CDC estimates that between 1.6 
and 3.8 million sports-related TBIs occur every year in the United States.39  
 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 710.  Parkinsonism shares symptoms found in Parkinson’s disease, but 
parkinsonism is a symptom complex and differs from Parkinson’s disease, which is a specific 
neurodegenerative illness. Paul J. Tuite & Kimberly Krawczewski, Parkinsonism:  A Review-
of-Systems Approach to Diagnosis, 27 SEMINARS NEUROLOGY 113, 113–14 (2007).  
Parkinson’s disease is just one of the many potential causes of parkinsonism. Id. 
 31. See Sergio R. Russo Buzzini & Kevin M. Guskiewicz, Sport-Related Concussion in 
the Young Athlete, 18 CURRENT OPINION PEDIATRICS 376, 377 (2006). 
 32. See Steven Reinberg, Teens May Fare Worse After Concussion Than Children or 
Adults, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/ 
news/articles/2012/02/28/teens-may-fare-worse-after-concussion-than-children-or-adults 
[https://perma.cc/2DFG-C23G]. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Antoine Bechara et al., Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex, 
10 CEREBRAL CORTEX 295, 295 (2000). 
 35. See Michael McCrea et al., Unreported Concussion in High School Football Players:  
Implications for Prevention, 14 CLINICAL J. SPORT MED. 13, 13 (2004) (“The diagnosis of 
sports-related concussion is perhaps the most elusive challenge facing sports medicine 
clinicians.”); see also Harvey, supra note 14, at 75 (noting that best practices in the 
identification of TBIs now involve precompetition baseline measurements and computerized 
testing, provided by companies such as ImPACT); infra Part III.A.2. 
 36. See CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 15, at 10–11. 
 37. See id. at 10 (“It’s hard to take seriously an invisible injury with subtle symptoms that 
often seem to pass quickly.”). 
 38. See McCrea et al., supra note 35, at 13–14. 
 39. Jean A. Langlois et al., The Epidemiology and Impact of Traumatic Brain Injury:  A 
Brief Overview, 21 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHABILITATION 375, 375–76 (2006) (“Although a 
previous [CDC] study estimated that approximately 300,000 such injuries occur each year, it 
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This estimate is conservative due to the unknown number of concussions that 
are treated at home or simply go unrecognized.40  Moreover, the potential 
impact on youth athletes is significant:  among youth ages fifteen to twenty-
four, sports are a leading cause of TBI, second only to motor vehicle 
accidents.41  This issue is aggravated by the risk of second impact syndrome 
and the rising popularity of youth sports.  Once an athlete suffers one 
concussion, the risk of a second concussion increases three to six times.42  In 
addition, according to the National Federation of State High School 
Associations, nearly 7.9 million student athletes participated in high school 
sports in 2015 to 2016, a number which is on the rise for the twenty-seventh 
consecutive year.43 
B.  History of State Legislation 
Over the past decade, the public has gained a greater appreciation of the 
connection between sports and brain injuries as well as the general issues 
associated with such injuries.44  This increased public awareness has led to 
state legislative reforms, the first of which was enacted in Washington 
State.45  Washington’s Lystedt Law, which most other states have emulated, 
contains three primary components.46  First, it requires all public school 
districts to provide annual educational programs and materials that inform 
coaches, parents, and student athletes about the nature and risks of 
concussions.47  Second, the law specifies that any athlete suspected of 
sustaining a concussion during sports activity must be immediately removed 
from play.48  Third, any such athlete may not return to action until she has 
been evaluated by a licensed health-care provider who has been trained in the 
 
included only TBIs for which the person reported a loss of consciousness. . . .  [A] more 
accurate approximation may be that 1.6 million to 3.8 million sports-related TBIs occur each 
year, including those for which no medical care is sought.  This estimate might still be low 
because many of these injuries go unrecognized and thus uncounted.”). 
 40. Id. at 375. 
 41. Luke M. Gessel et al., Concussions Among United States High School and Collegiate 
Athletes, 42 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 495, 495 (2007). 
 42. Robert C. Cantu, Posttraumatic Retrograde and Anterograde Amnesia:  
Pathophysiology and Implications in Grading and Safe Return to Play, 36 J. ATHLETIC 
TRAINING 244, 246 (2001). 
 43. NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, NFHS HANDBOOK 2016–17, at 55 (2016), 
http://www.nfhs.org/media/1017531/2016-17-nfhs-handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ6S-YZ 
L2]. 
 44. See, e.g., State v. McKague, 246 P.3d 558, 575 (Wash. Ct. App.) (Quinn-Brintnall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that public awareness of brain injuries has 
increased in recent years in part due to greater media coverage of such injuries and the 
increased use of product warning labels), aff’d, 262 P.3d 1225 (Wash. 2011). 
 45. See Alex Marvez, Lystedt Lays Down Law on Concussions, FOX SPORTS (May 
20, 2012), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/zack-lystedt-bring-awareness-nfl-concussion-
issue-lystedt-law-052012 [https://perma.cc/8QZ3-W9K6]. 
 46. See Lee Green, Legal Perspectives, Recommendations on State Concussion Laws, 
NAT’L FED’N ST. HIGH SCH. ASSOCIATIONS (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.nfhs.org/articles/ 
legal-perspectives-recommendations-on-state-concussion-laws [https://perma.cc/CL96-G3 
FZ]. 
 47. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190(2) (2016). 
 48. See id. § 28A.600.190(3). 
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evaluation and management of concussions and has received written 
clearance from that provider.49 
Since the enactment of the Lystedt Law, all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted youth sports concussion legislation.50  Both the 
National Football League (NFL) and National Collegiate Athletic 
Association have lobbied extensively for this legislation.51  On January 30, 
2014, Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant signed into law the Mississippi 
Youth Concussion Act, making Mississippi the fiftieth state to pass youth 
sports concussion legislation.52  While the Mississippi Legislature clearly 
used the Lystedt Law as a guide, it deviated from the Washington model in 
that it requires neither annual education programs nor written medical 
clearance.53 
C.  The Current Benchmark:  Washington’s Lystedt Law 
Since the Lystedt Law was enacted, most state legislatures have emulated 
this statute in their own legislation.54  Therefore, the disparities that exist 
across state statutes can be objectively measured by using Washington’s 
Lystedt Law as a benchmark.  To facilitate the comparison of various state 
concussion laws, this Note provides relevant language from the Washington 
statute below. 
1.  The Statute 
Section 28A.600.190 of Washington’s Revised Code is entitled, “Youth 
Sports—Concussion and Head Injury Guidelines—Injured Athlete 
Restrictions.”55  Section 28A.600.190(1)(c) defines the problem that the 
statute seeks to address:  “some affected youth athletes are prematurely 
returned to play resulting in actual or potential physical injury or death to 
youth athletes in the state of Washington.”56  The statute then identifies three 
primary tools to confront this issue. 
First, the statute establishes a guideline that this Note refers to as the 
“education tenet.”57  Section 28A.600.190(2) provides: 
 
 49. See id. § 28A.600.190(4). 
 50. See Green, supra note 46. 
 51. See NFL, NCAA Lobby for Concussion Laws, ESPN (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/7454729/nfl-ncaa-urge-states-pass-concussion-laws 
[https://perma.cc/VT9L-NBUC]. 
 52. See Joe Frollo, Mississippi Becomes 50th State to Pass Youth Sports Concussion Law, 
USA FOOTBALL (Jan. 30, 2014), http://web.usafootball.com/blogs/zackery-lystedt/post/8044/ 
mississippi-becomes-50th-state-to-pass-youth-sports-concussion-law [https://perma.cc/9KW 
2-GXJY]. 
 53. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-24-5 (2017). 
 54. See Kerri McGowan Lowrey, Summary Matrix of State Laws Addressing Concussions 
in Youth Sports, NETWORK PUB. HEALTH L. (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.networkforphl.org/_ 
asset/7xwh09/Sports-Concussion-Table.pdf (summarizing the legislative steps taken by each 
state) [https://perma.cc/DX68-SVP8]. 
 55. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190 (2016). 
 56. Id. § 28A.600.190(1)(c). 
 57. See id. § 28A.600.190(2). 
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Each school district’s board of directors shall work in concert with the 
Washington interscholastic activities association to develop the guidelines 
and other pertinent information and forms to inform and educate coaches, 
youth athletes, and their parents and/or guardians of the nature and risk of 
concussion and head injury including continuing to play after concussion 
or head injury.  On a yearly basis, a concussion and head injury information 
sheet shall be signed and returned by the youth athlete and the athlete’s 
parent and/or guardian prior to the youth athlete’s initiating practice or 
competition.58 
Second, the statute establishes a guideline that this Note labels as the 
“removal from play tenet.”59  Section 28A.600.190(3) provides:  “A youth 
athlete who is suspected of sustaining a concussion or head injury in a 
practice or game shall be removed from competition at that time.”60 
Third, the statute establishes a guideline that this Note refers to as the 
“medical clearance tenet.”61  Section 28A.600.190(4) provides: 
A youth athlete who has been removed from play may not return to play 
until the athlete is evaluated by a licensed health care provider trained in 
the evaluation and management of concussion and receives written 
clearance to return to play from that health care provider.  The health care 
provider may be a volunteer.  A volunteer who authorizes a youth athlete 
to return to play is not liable for civil damages resulting from any act or 
omission in the rendering of such care, other than acts or omissions 
constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.62 
These three pillars have served as the foundation for most state youth 
concussion laws.63  It is important to note, however, that while the 
Washington statute applies only to student athletes in public schools, other 
state statutes often extend application to both public and private recreational 
leagues.64  The following subsection broadly canvases the scope of state 
legislation as a whole, in terms of the tenets that have been adopted and the 
extent to which other state statutes reach private leagues. 
2.  Lystedt as a Barometer 
While the Lystedt Law emphasizes three primary tenetseducational 
programs, removal from play guidelines, and medical clearance before 
returning to playnot all state concussion laws address each of these issues, 
and, therefore, significant variations exist between the legal requirements set 
forth by each state.65  According to a study conducted by the Network for 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. § 28A.600.190(3). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. § 28A.600.190(4). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Douglas E. Abrams, Concussion Safety in Children’s Sports:  A Central Role for 
the “Power of the Permit,” 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 5 (2015) (citing the Arkansas concussion 
statute as one that maximizes protection “by regulating both interscholastic play and private 
youth sports organizations”). 
 65. See Lowrey, supra note 54. 
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Public Health Law, only thirty statutes mandate concussion education for 
coaches, and just twenty-one statutes extend the scope of the law’s coverage 
beyond school athletics to nonschool-sponsored youth sports.66  To be sure, 
each state has the authority to implement its own variations; this Note does 
not suggest otherwise.  However, less protective states leave youth athletes 
more vulnerable to both the short- and long-term effects of TBI.67 
In assessing the relative strength of state laws, it is helpful to use 
Washington’s Lystedt Law as a barometer, given that many laws now include 
all three Lystedt tenets in some variation.68  In terms of the education tenet, 
forty-one states and the District of Columbia require that some form of TBI-
education material be distributed to parents and student athletes.69  Regarding 
removal from play, every jurisdiction now requires immediate removal from 
play following an actual or suspected concussion.70  As to medical clearance, 
forty-six states and the District of Columbia have provisions requiring written 
clearance.71  However, the type of medical professional that is required to 
provide such clearance varies widely based on the state:  some states require 
that a medical doctor provide the clearance, whereas other states rely on 
athletic trainers and nurses.72  Finally, even where there may be facial 
uniformity as to these three tenets, there often is tremendous variation across 
states in the application of these laws.73  Part II addresses these discrepancies 
in more detail. 
II.  ADDRESSING THE ISSUE AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS 
While every American child is now protected to some degree, children in 
certain states, like Washington, have been afforded greater protections than 
children in other states, like Mississippi.74  In addition, states have received 
limited guidance from Congress with regard to how best to protect youth 
athletes.75 
This part surveys state and, to a lesser extent, federal responses to the 
concussion epidemic.  Part II.A assesses the different levels of protection that 
exist across state youth concussion laws.  Next, Part II.B evaluates how these 
statutes are enforced both in terms of sanctions and tort liability.  Part II.C 
 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Kimberly G. Harmon et al., American Medical Society for Sports Medicine 
Position Statement:  Concussion in Sport, 23 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 1, 11–12 (2013) 
(discussing the short- and long-term risks associated with premature return to play). 
 68. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 89. 
 69. See Lowrey, supra note 54. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id.; see also Amanda Cook et al., Where Do We Go from Here?:  An Inside Look 
into the Development of Georgia’s Youth Concussion Law, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 284, 287 
(2014) (“[T]he question of who is allowed to evaluate, treat, and provide medical clearance is 
an area of big debate when it comes to concussion laws.”). 
 73. See Lowrey & Morain, supra note 18, at 291 (noting that, particularly in the case of 
youth sports concussion laws, “‘law on the streets’ may diverge from ‘law on the books’”). 
 74. See Green, supra note 46. 
 75. See Kevin Brandwein, Goals and Obstacles in Legislating Concussion Management 
in Youth Sports, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 28, 53 (2013); infra Part II.C. 
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examines the congressional response and Congress’s failure to provide a 
uniform national standard.  Finally, Part II.D surveys the perspectives of three 
academic commentators in terms of how to best increase protection for youth 
athletes. 
A.  Comparing State Statutes:  Leaders and Laggards 
Using the Lystedt Law as a reference point, this Note sorts state statutes 
into five distinct tiers:  “Laggards,” “Loafers,” “Lystedters,” “Lystedters-
Plus,” and “Leaders.”  These tiers range from least to most protective, 
respectively, in terms of the strength of protections offered to youth 
athletes.76  All state statutes match the Lystedt Law’s second tenet of required 
removal from play.77  However, beyond that, state laws include varying 
levels of protection and differ with regard to the strength of the medical 
clearance tenet, the education tenet, whether the training of coaches is 
encouraged or required, and whether the statute reaches private recreational 
athletics.  Each of these differences results in varying levels of protections 
offered to youth athletes, which allows this Note to place each state statute 
into a distinct tier, as presented below. 
1.  A Tiered Approach 
The Laggards tier includes Georgia,78 Idaho,79 Mississippi,80 and 
Wyoming.81  These states offer the least protective youth concussion 
statutes.82  While these jurisdictions all require medical clearance of some 
sort before an athlete can return to play, they do not require written 
clearance.83  This distinction may seem trivial, but written clearance by a 
licensed health-care professional offers an added layer of protection for youth 
athletes:  it ensures that the considerations on which the return-to-play 
decisions are made are restricted to medical ones, as opposed to decisions 
motivated by a desire to win the game.84  Moreover, requiring the 
documentation of medical clearance increases accountability among health-
care professionals and reduces the risk of premature return to play, thereby 
decreasing the risk of TBI.85 
 
 76. A summary of these tiers is provided below in the appendix. 
 77. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 78. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-324.1 (2017). 
 79. IDAHO CODE § 33-1625 (2017). 
 80. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-24-5 (2017). 
 81. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-2-202(a)(xxxiii), 21-3-110(a)(xxxii) (2017). 
 82. See Lowrey, supra note 54. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 286 (noting that the requirement of written clearance 
aims to relieve coaches, athletic trainers, and parents of having to make the return-to-play 
decision). 
 85. See Elisabeth Koloup, Comment, Get Your Head in the Game:  Legislation Addressing 
Concussions in Youth Sports and Its Development in Maryland, 42 U. BALT. L.F. 207, 223–24 
(2012). 
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The Loafers tier includes Colorado,86 Minnesota,87 Missouri,88 New 
Hampshire,89 New York,90 South Carolina,91 and Utah.92  These states 
provide greater protection than states in the Laggards tier, given that they 
require written medical clearance, but they fail to match the full protections 
offered by Washington’s Lystedt Law, particularly concerning the education 
tenet.93  For example, Missouri, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Utah 
do not require coaches to undergo formal education or training in the 
recognition and management of concussions.94  In addition, these four states 
do not require a student’s acknowledgement of having received educational 
materials before the student’s participation in school-sponsored athletics.95  
While Minnesota and New York both require the training of coaches and the 
development and publication or distribution of educational materials 
regarding TBI safety, these states do not require acknowledgment of receipt 
or informed consent from either parents or students before a youth athlete’s 
participation.96  Colorado offers even fewer protections than Minnesota and 
New York, given that its statute does not expressly require the development 
of educational materials.97 
The Lystedters tier includes thirteen states, plus the District of Columbia, 
which satisfy the three basic tenets of the Lystedt Law.98  All of these states 
require education for both parents and student athletes, mandatory removal 
from play following a suspected concussion, and written medical clearance 
before returning to physical activity.99  These states do not offer any 
innovation beyond the protections offered by the three tenets. 
The Lystedters-Plus tier includes sixteen states that match the Lystedt 
Law’s three basic tenets and require the training of coaches, as opposed to 
merely suggesting this.100  For example, while the Lystedt Law requires 
 
 86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-43-103 (2017). 
 87. MINN. STAT. §§ 121A.37–.38 (2017). 
 88. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.765 (2016). 
 89. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200:49–:52 (2017). 
 90. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 305(42) (McKinney 2017). 
 91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-75 (2016). 
 92. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-53-101 to -102, -201, -301, -401 (West 2016). 
 93. See Lowrey, supra note 54, at 3, 11–14, 18–19. 
 94. See id. at 12–13, 18–19. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. at 22 n.2. 
 97. See id. at 3. 
 98. ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.30.142–.143 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(24)(b) 
(2016); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (West 2016); D.C. CODE §§ 7-2871.01–.05 (2017); FLA. 
STAT. § 1006.20 (2017); IOWA CODE § 280.13C (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-135 (2017); 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-9101 to -9106 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 385B.080 (2016); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 115C-12.23 (2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-155 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
271.5 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 118.293 (2017). 
 99. See Lowrey, supra note 54, at 1–2, 5, 8, 12–15, 20–21. 
 100. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-149b to -149c (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 303 (2017); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.445 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 222 (2017); MONT. 
CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-1301 to -1304 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:40-41.1 to -41.7 (West 
2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-31 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-18.2-04 (2017); 24 PA. 
CONS. STAT. §§ 5322–5323 (2016); 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-91-1 to -4 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 13-36-4 to -14 (2017); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 38.151–.160 (West 2015); VT. 
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coaches to receive an annual concussion and head injury information sheet, 
it does not require coaches to complete concussion-specific education or 
training.101  By contrast, Texas requires that each coach complete the state’s 
“safety training program” developed by the commissioner of education.102  
This safety training program requires coaches to receive training in 
emergency action planning and in the recognition of “head and neck injuries, 
concussions, [and] injuries related to second impact syndrome.”103  The 
nature of a concussion requires those charged with supervising players to 
recognize external symptoms.104  This suggests that states that require 
holistic and inclusive training programs for coaches are more effective than 
those where the education tenet merely requires the distribution of an 
information sheet. 
Finally, the Leaders tier includes Alabama,105 Arkansas,106 Illinois,107 
Indiana,108 Louisiana,109 Maryland,110 Michigan,111 Ohio,112 Oregon,113 and 
Tennessee.114  These states satisfy the Lystedt Law’s three basic tenets, 
require training for coaches and add an extra layer of protection by extending 
to both public school athletics and private recreational sports.115  For 
example, Arkansas’s law expressly applies to any organized athletic activity 
in which the participants, a majority of whom are under nineteen years of 
age, are engaged in an athletic game or competition “against another team, 
club, or entity,” or in practice or preparation for such a game.116  By 
expanding the scope of the law’s reach beyond public schools, states in the 
Leaders tier are able to protect more of their youth athletes.117 
2.  Strengths of State Legislation 
Because of the grave effects of concussions on our youth, current state 
laws merely represent a starting point for youth concussion reforms.118  
 
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1431 (2016); W. VA. CODE § 18-2-25a (2016); see also 2012 Haw. Sess. 
Laws 197; 2012 Me. Laws 688. 
 101. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190(2). 
 102. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 33.202(a)–(b).  The title of the statute, “Safety Training 
Required,” makes clear that the training requirement for coaches is mandatory. Id. 
 103. See id. § 33.202(c)(2)(D). 
 104. See supra Part I.A. 
 105. ALA. CODE § 22-11E-2 (2017). 
 106. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-708, -710 (2017). 
 107. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/22-80 (2016). 
 108. IND. CODE §§ 20-34-7-1 to -6 (2016). 
 109. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1089.1–.5 (2016). 
 110. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-433 (West 2017). 
 111. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.9155–.9156 (2016). 
 112. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.539 (West 2016). 
 113. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 336.485, 417.875 (2016). 
 114. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-55-501 to -503 (2016). 
 115. See Lowrey, supra note 54, at 1–2, 7–10, 15–16, 19. 
 116. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-710(a)(1) (2017). 
 117. See Abrams, supra note 64, at 8 (“A concussion is a concussion, regardless of whether 
a boy or girl sustains it in interscholastic play or in a private youth league.”). 
 118. See Howard Fendrich & Eddie Pells, AP Analysis:  Youth Concussion Laws 
Pushed by NFL Lack Bite, AP (Jan. 28, 2015), http://pro32.ap.org/article/ap-analysis-youth-
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Therefore, to improve future legislation, it is vital to evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses across the spectrum of state legislation.  Washington’s 
Lystedt Law and laws that emulate it have succeeded in requiring that any 
athlete suspected of having sustained a TBI must be immediately removed 
from action and cannot be returned to play until receiving clearance from a 
medical professional.119  While this may seem relatively modest, this 
mandate expressly removes the return-to-play decision from coaches, 
players, and parentsactors who may be driven primarily by a desire to 
winand instead assigns the decision to a medical professional, whose 
interests are more likely to be aligned with the safety of the youth athlete.120  
This medical clearance mandate also reduces the risk of second impact 
syndrome.121  In addition, state laws have succeeded in increasing awareness 
among coaches, players, and parents through the use of informed consent and 
training requirements.122  While state statutes vary in terms of how informed 
consent is obtained and how educational trainings are conducted, there can 
be no doubt that these laws have made key decision makers more 
knowledgeable regarding the risks of TBI.123 
3.  Weaknesses of State Legislation 
While the Lystedt Law and its progeny have provided greater protections 
to student athletes, these laws have generally been marked by four primary 
shortcomings.  First, many state concussion laws are vaguely worded, 
particularly regarding the informed consent and education requirements.124  
This has allowed some states, particularly those in the Laggards125 and 
Loafers126 tiers, to follow the letter of the law without achieving their 
 
concussion-laws-pushed-nfl-lack-bite-0 [https://perma.cc/R82C-ZXU6].  In reference to the 
shortcomings of particular state statutes, NFL Senior Vice President of Health and Safety 
Policy Jeff Miller stated, “We did make compromises . . . .  Better to get something good, and 
get something in place, as opposed to shoot for something fantastic in all placesand fail.” 
Id. 
 119. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190(3)–(4) (2016); Harvey, supra note 14, at 92–
93. 
 120. See Brandwein, supra note 75, at 49 (noting that medical professionals are likely to 
err on the side of caution, given that these professionals are generally motivated by an “oath, 
respect for the risks inherent in a head injury, genuine concern for the student, or fear of a 
malpractice suit”). 
 121. See id. at 53. 
 122. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 93. 
 123. See Brandwein, supra note 75, at 49 (“These types of rule changes demonstrate 
awareness surrounding head injuries, which have led to a reduction in the concussion risks 
associated with competition.”). 
 124. See Lesley Lueke, Comment, High School Athletes and Concussions, 32 J. LEGAL 
MED. 483, 495 (2011). 
 125. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 126. For example, the laws in Minnesota and New York require that educational 
information or materials be developed, distributed, or made accessible, but these laws do not 
require acknowledgment of receipt or informed consent prior to a youth athlete’s participation 
in sports. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  While such information might be posted 
on a school district’s website, it does not necessarily mean that the information has actually 
been read by youth athletes. 
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statutes’ intended purpose.127  Second, many state statutes apply only to 
public school districts and organizations that utilize public school 
facilities.128  As a result, children enrolled in private schools and children 
who play for private recreational teams, such as Pop Warner football teams129 
and travel soccer clubs, are often unprotected.130  When states choose to 
protect only youth athletes in public schools, it signals that the state 
legislature is more concerned with the cost of enforcement than any 
justification grounded in health or safety.131  Third, state statutes have failed 
to provide strong enforcement mechanisms.132  Specifically, few states 
impose penalties on coaches or school districts that fail to comply with the 
statute.133  Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, existing youth sports TBI 
laws focus primarily on reducing the secondary effects of concussions as 
opposed to attacking their primary causes, such as in-sport maneuvers.134  
While it is important to protect children after they have sustained TBIs, it is 
equally if not more important to prevent the TBI from occurring in the first 
instance.  Each of these issues is exacerbated by the failure of almost all states 
to develop a system to track individual athletes and thereby evaluate the 
effectiveness of their laws.135  A better understanding of these weaknesses, 
particularly in terms of quantifiable data,136 would help state legislatures 
strengthen youth concussion legislation. 
B.  Enforcement of State Legislation 
While there are significant variations across states in terms of the basic 
adopted tenets, there is also a wide gap in how these laws are enforced.137  
This is due, in part, to the fact that Washington’s Lystedt Law is largely silent 
on the issue of enforcement.138  In fact, the only language relevant to 
enforcement is a provision seeking to immunize volunteers from civil 
 
 127. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 495. 
 128. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(24)(b) (2016) (limiting coverage to 
organizations that utilize public school facilities), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-710(a) (2017) 
(extending statutory coverage to all youth athletic activities). 
 129. Pop Warner is a national nonprofit organization that provides youth football, 
cheerleading, and dance programs. 
 130. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 285. 
 131. But see Abrams, supra note 64, at 8–11 (noting that when legislatures extend 
protections to private youth organizations that use public facilities, the change is “unlikely to 
impose significant fiscal constraints”). 
 132. See Phoebe Anne Amberg, Comment, Protecting Kids’ Melons:  Potential Liability 
and Enforcement Issues with Youth Concussion Laws, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 171, 183 
(2012). 
 133. See id.; see also infra Part II.B. 
 134. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 248, 255; see also Harmon et al., supra note 67, at 2–3, 
13 (differentiating between “primary” and “secondary” prevention). 
 135. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 104–05. 
 136. See id. at 97 (citing Rhode Island as a state that has introduced successful policy 
experimentation in the form of baseline testing before the beginning of every sports season, 
which will provide useful data metrics and clarify areas of scientific ambiguity). 
 137. See Lowrey & Morain, supra note 18, at 296 (noting that many states have established 
“little to no formal enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance”). 
 138. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190 (2016). 
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liability.139  Thus, although most states have followed the Lystedt Law’s 
three primary tenets, state enforcement mechanismsan area where the 
Lystedt Law is restrainedhave generally lacked uniformity.  Today, when 
a youth athlete suffers a TBI, there are two primary modes of recourse against 
coaches and school districts held to be in violation of the statute:  (1) express 
statutory sanctions, where applicable, and (2) tort liability.140 
1.  Statutory Sanctions 
In an effort to improve enforcement, some state legislatures have expressly 
imposed sanctions on coaches and school districts that fail to adhere to the 
statutory mandate.141  These provisions aim to limit any incentive that a 
coach may have to keep a youth athlete in the game after suffering a TBI.142  
Currently, such sanctions exist in only a handful of states.  In Connecticut, 
for instance, the State Board of Education may revoke a coaching permit from 
“any coach found to be in violation” of the statute.143  In Massachusetts, a 
school that fails to comply with the statute, as determined by the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health, “shall be subject to penalties as 
determined by the department.”144 
The Pennsylvania state statute provides the most specific statutory 
sanctions of any state.  In Pennsylvania, the governing body of a school is 
required to suspend a coach for the remainder of the season if the coach fails 
to properly remove a student athlete from play.145  Upon a second violation, 
the coach will be suspended for the remainder of the current season and for 
the following season.146  And if a coach violates the statute a third time, she 
will receive a “permanent suspension from coaching any athletic activity.”147  
Given that these sanctions incentivize coaches to take added precautions 
when a youth athlete appears to suffer a TBI, it is unclear why the vast 
majority of states have failed to implement similar provisions.148  The best 
explanation, perhaps, is that such a provision would overexpose coaches to 
punishment and lead to unwarranted lawsuits.149  This hypothesis is 
supported by the fact that many states expressly immunize their coaches from 
liability.150  For example, concussion legislation in Texas provides express 
 
 139. See id. § 28A.600.190(4) (“A volunteer who authorizes a youth athlete to return to 
play is not liable for civil damages resulting from any act or omission in the rendering of such 
care, other than acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton 
misconduct.”). 
 140. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 97–98. 
 141. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-149b(f) (2017); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5323(f) 
(2016). 
 142. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 97. 
 143. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-149b(f). 
 144. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 222(e) (2017). 
 145. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5323(f)(1). 
 146. Id. § 5323(f)(2). 
 147. Id. § 5323(f)(3). 
 148. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 97. 
 149. See Koloup, supra note 85, at 224 (noting that such a provision, if enacted, could have 
a potentially “chilling effect on coaching”). 
 150. See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
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immunity to school district officials or employees, emergency responders, 
and members of the concussion oversight team.151  Given that relatively few 
states expressly impose penalties on coaches who fail to adhere to the letter 
of the law, many parents of injured youth athletes have turned to tort liability 
as a means of civil recourse.152 
2.  The Unsettled Role of Tort Law 
When a youth athlete who has suffered a TBI is prematurely permitted to 
return to play, parents of the injured player may bring a civil lawsuit against 
the player’s coaches and the school district as the coaches’ employer.153  
However, most state concussion statutes do not expressly provide a cause of 
action.154  For example, Washington’s Lystedt Law does not,155 and 
Washington state courts have held that, in light of this silence, there is no 
implied cause of action.156  Moreover, other state statutes expressly dictate 
that a cause of action is not provided.157  As a result, when a parent initiates 
a suit against a coach or school district, it tends to be based on common law 
negligence.158 
a.  Common Law Negligence 
Return-to-play lawsuits, primarily premised on a tort claim of negligence, 
often allege that the coaches have failed to either properly identify or manage 
a concussion.159  To prevail, a plaintiff must prove the basic elements of 
common law negligence:  the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, the 
defendant breached that duty of care and exposed the plaintiff to the risk of a 
substantial loss or damages, the breach was both the actual and proximate 
cause of the harm, and the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary loss or injury as a 
consequence.160  In cases where a youth athlete has suffered a TBI, a breach 
of the duty of care may arise when a coach prematurely allows the athlete to 
return to play.161  In addition, plaintiffs often claim that school districts are 
vicariously liable for the negligence of a coach under their supervision.162  
However, as discussed below, there are certain roadblocks that often obstruct 
common law negligence suits. 
 
 151. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.159 (West 2015). 
 152. See Perry A. Zirkel, Court Decisions Specific to Public School Responses to Student 
Concussions, 35 PHYSICAL DISABILITIES, no. 1, 2016, at 3. 
 153. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 268. 
 154. See Dionne L. Koller, Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 681, 
718 (2016). 
 155. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Swank v. Valley Christian Sch., 374 P.3d 245 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (holding 
that Washington’s Lystedt Law does not create an implied cause of action). 
 157. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 118.293(6) (2017) (“This section does not create any liability 
for, or a cause of action against, any person.”). 
 158. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 259–60. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. at 260. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. at 261. 
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b.  Immunity Provisions 
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a public school board, as a state 
agent, may be immunized from vicarious liability for the negligence of its 
employees.163  In addition, coaches, as employees of a state agent, may also 
receive qualified immunity.164  This immunity defense varies from state to 
state and depends on the provisions in the relevant concussion statute.165  In 
fact, twenty-five jurisdictions have enacted youth sports legislation 
attempting to limit liability for school districts, coaches, volunteers, or 
health-care providers who might face lawsuits in the wake of a TBI-related 
event.166  Like the Lystedt Law, many of these state statutes provide 
exemptions from liability, except in cases of gross negligence or willful or 
wanton misconduct.167  A typical statute provides that, so long as a school 
employee or coach can prove that her conduct was made in good faith and in 
compliance with the law and “local school board policies relative to the 
management of concussions and head injuries,” she will receive immunity 
from liability.168 
c.  Fourteenth Amendment Claims 
Due to this varying pattern of immunity across states,169 and because an 
immunity defense often blocks claims of common law negligence, the 
parents of injured youth athletes often assert claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.170  Specifically, these plaintiffs allege 
that public actors created a danger to the bodily integrity or physical safety 
of a student in their charge.171  This standard is frequently referred to as the 
“state-created danger theory.”172  To succeed on this claim against a coach, 
a plaintiff must show that the coach’s conduct was at least deliberately 
indifferent to the student’s safety such that it “shocks the conscience.”173  To 
succeed on a claim against a school district, a plaintiff must show that a 
certain practice or custom, ratified by the school district, causally connects to 
the coach’s deliberately indifferent conduct.174  In these types of return-to-
 
 163. See Zirkel, supra note 152, at 3. 
 164. Qualified immunity “balances two important intereststhe need to hold public 
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials 
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson 
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
 165. See Koller, supra note 154, at 718. 
 166. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 97. 
 167. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 118.293 (2017) (“Any athletic coach, official involved in an 
athletic activity, or volunteer who fails to remove a person from a youth athletic activity . . . is 
immune from civil liability for any injury resulting from that omission unless it constitutes 
gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.”). 
 168. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200:51 (2017). 
 169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Zirkel, supra note 152, at 3. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 6–7. 
 173. See id. (noting that this standard “poses a rather steep slope to establish liability”). 
 174. See id. at 6. 
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play cases, court decisions across states have largely favored school district 
defendants; however, case law on this issue is unsettled.175 
d.  Case Law Is Far from Crystallized 
Given that return-to-play cases have only begun to emerge in recent years, 
it is still not entirely clear, even within a single state, when a civil lawsuit 
will result in liability, no liability, or a settlement agreement.176  
Pennsylvaniaparticularly its federal courtshas served as a forum for 
several return-to-play cases and provides an illuminating example of this 
uncertainty.177 
In M.U. v. Downingtown High School East,178 the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania found for the defendant-coach and defendant-school district 
where the parents of an injured high school soccer player brought claims 
against the coach and school district, alleging violations of both common law 
negligence and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.179  The 
parents alleged that the coach negligently failed to remove their daughter 
from the game after she was struck on the head by another player.180  The 
parents also alleged that the school district failed to implement proper 
policies regarding concussion evaluation and that this failure amounted to a 
violation of their daughter’s constitutional rights.181  The court dismissed the 
negligence claims against the coach based on Pennsylvania’s provision of 
governmental immunity.182  The negligence claim did not fit within any of 
the limited exceptions to the immunity provision.183  Further, the court 
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process claim, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts sufficient 
to show deliberate indifference by the coach.184 
The decision in Mann v. Palmerton Area School District,185 in which the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania sided with the plaintiff-parents, presents a 
 
 175. See id. at 14. 
 176. Compare M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F. Supp. 3d 612, 634 (E.D. Pa. 
2015) (granting the coach’s motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim 
and also granting the coach’s motion to dismiss the common law negligence claim, where a 
youth athlete suffered a TBI), with Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 33 F. Supp. 3d 530, 
543 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (denying the district’s motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process claim, where a youth athlete suffered a TBI). 
 177. Pennsylvania is a popular forum for these types of cases due to its applicable immunity 
provisions, its emphasis on interscholastic athletics, and its relatively high rate of education 
litigation. Zirkel, supra note 152, at 6. 
 178. 103 F. Supp. 3d 612 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
 179. Id. at 616–18. 
 180. Id. at 617.  The parents further alleged that the coach ignored the advice of their 
daughter’s teammate and the opposing coach, who both advised that the player should be 
removed from the game for medical evaluation. Id. 
 181. Id. at 616–17. 
 182. Id. at 630; see supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Zirkel, supra note 152, at 5. 
 184. See Downingtown, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 624. 
 185. 33 F. Supp. 3d 530 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
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different outcome.186  In Mann, the parents of an injured high school football 
player brought a claim against the coaches and school district, alleging 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause under the 
state-created danger theory.187  The parents alleged that the coaches told their 
son to continue practicing after their son collided with a teammate, without 
first providing proper medical evaluation.188  The parents claimed that the 
school district failed to implement proper policies regarding concussion 
evaluation and that this failure constituted a state-created danger.189  Here, 
the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Fourteenth 
Amendment claim.190  In contrast with Downingtown, the court held that the 
plaintiffs successfully alleged facts that showed the coaches’ deliberate 
indifference and that the school district failed to train coaches on proper 
safety protocol.191  In each case, at least one member of the coaching staff 
was aware of the hit suffered by the player but failed to remove the player 
from participation.192  Yet, with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment claims, 
the respective courts adopted different views.193  This difference in 
outcomes is indicative of the inconsistencies that exist across jurisdictions in 
the enforcement of youth sports concussion legislation.194 
3.  Enforcement Is a Major Area of Weakness 
As discussed above, state youth concussion laws have established 
relatively few enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with the 
 
 186. Id. at 530. 
 187. Id. at 535.  The parents argued that their claim against the coaches satisfied the four 
elements required to state a claim under § 1983 for a state-created danger that violated their 
child’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Id. at 537 (“(1) [T]he harm ultimately 
caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability 
that shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such 
that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts or a member of a discrete 
class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state’s actions as opposed 
to a member of the public in general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority 
in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to 
danger than had the state not acted at all.” (quoting Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 304–05 
(3d Cir. 2006))).  Consistent with these four elements, the parents alleged that the coaches (1) 
should have known that traumatic brain injuries were a common hazard of football; (2) told 
the player to continue practicing despite the fact that the player sustained substantial hits to 
the head in the open view of trainers and coaches; (3) shared such a relationship with the 
player; and (4) “personally observed [the player’s] disoriented disposition yet acted in 
deliberate indifference to his health, safety and welfare by placing him back into practice.” Id. 
at 537–41. 
 188. Id. at 534. 
 189. Id. at 535. 
 190. Id. at 540. 
 191. Id. at 541–42. 
 192. M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F. Supp. 3d, 612, 617 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Mann, 
33 F. Supp. 3d at 534. 
 193. See supra notes 184, 190 and accompanying text. 
 194. Compare Croce v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., No. 13-6831, 2015 WL 1565834 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 8, 2015) (holding in favor of the defendant-school district), and Ripple v. Marble 
Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 99 F. Supp. 3d 662 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (holding in favor of the 
defendant-school district), with Alt v. Shirey, No. 11-468, 2012 WL 726593 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 
1, 2012) (holding in favor of the plaintiff-parents with regard to the due process claim). 
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statutory mandate.195  As a result, many of these state statutes lack sufficient 
teeth.196  Because many statutes are silent concerning enforcement 
procedures, and some even include immunity provisions for coaches and 
health-care professionals, there is little accountability for failing to manage 
youth concussions as required.197  This concern is not new.  When 
Washington’s Lystedt Law was enacted in 2009, one Washington senator 
voted against it citing concerns about who would be held liable for deciding 
whether to remove athletes from play.198  One reason, perhaps, why state 
legislatures have failed to enact tighter enforcement mechanisms may be the 
longstanding notion of minimal government involvement in sports.199  In 
addition, there remains a concern of overexposing coaches and health-care 
providers to liability; if enforcement measures are too harsh, they may deter 
adults from entering these important roles.200  However, to ensure adequate 
protections moving forward, many commentators believe that state 
legislatures should begin to strike a balance between protecting against 
unwarranted lawsuits while also establishing accountability for proper 
concussion management.201 
C.  Federal Law Lags:  Failed Attempts at Reform 
As discussed in Parts II.A and II.B, the primary focus of this Note is state 
legislation and the disparity that exists across states in terms of the 
protections afforded to youth athletes.  With that in mind, it is important to 
briefly address Congress’s failed attempts at developing and implementing 
comprehensive youth concussion legislation.  By understanding why certain 
federal bills have failed, state legislators can add to their evolving knowledge 
of concussion care and management. 
Since the enactment of the Lystedt Law, the federal government has failed 
to enact each concussion bill that has come to the floor.202  In 2010 alone, 
two federal bills were introduced but failed to pass.203  The first bill, the 
Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2010 (ConTACT), passed in 
 
 195. See supra note 137. 
 196. See Koller, supra note 154, at 718 (noting that existing concussion statutes have been 
described as “legally ineffective”). 
 197. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 494–96. 
 198. See Anderson, supra note 4 (noting State Senator Bob Morton’s concern that the 
proposed law did not adequately address consequences for those who disobeyed the rule). 
 199. See Koller, supra note 154, at 719. 
 200. See Kevin Grier & Tyler Cowen, What Would the End of Football Look Like?, 
GRANTLAND (Feb. 13, 2012), http://grantland.com/features/cte-concussion-crisis-economic-
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society.”) [https://perma.cc/27SU-DCPE]. 
 201. See, e.g., Koller, supra note 154, at 730–31; Lueke, supra note 124, at 499–500; 
Wilson, supra note 14, at 288–91. 
 202. See Koller, supra note 154, at 713–15 (noting that, as of 2016, federal legislation has 
been proposed but not yet enacted); Lueke, supra note 124, at 491. 
 203. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 491–92. 
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the House of Representatives but never reached the Senate floor.204  With the 
stated goal of establishing a national standard, ConTACT would have 
required computerized baseline and postinjury testing for school-aged 
children, an aspect that most state laws lack.205  This initiative would have 
been funded with federal grants.206 
The second bill that similarly failed, the Protecting Student Athletes from 
Concussions Act of 2010 (PSACA I), would have required state agencies to 
issue regulations concerning concussion prevention and treatment.207  Under 
the act, these agencies would have received federal funding for enacting 
certain benchmark rules.208  PSACA I also would have included provisions 
requiring academic accommodations for students suffering from recent 
concussions.209  However, PSACA I never left committee, and when it was 
reintroduced in 2011 as PSACA II, it again failed to move beyond the 
committee stage.210 
In 2013, Congress made another attempt at national reform with the 
introduction of the Youth Sports Concussion Act of 2013.211  This act 
targeted the safety of sporting equipment by providing oversight of 
equipment manufacturers.212  More specifically, it authorized the Consumer 
Products Safety Commission to set standards for certain products, 
particularly sports-related protective equipment.213  Violations of these 
standards were to be treated as unfair or deceptive practices under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.214  However, like its predecessors, the bill died in 
committee.215  The act was reintroduced in February of 2016 but died at the 
end of the 114th Congress’s term in January of 2017.216 
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D.  Academic Perspectives 
Given that the Lystedt Law was not enacted until 2009 and federal 
concussion legislation is still in its infancy, youth sports concussion law 
represents an emerging area of law.  Moreover, because this issue involves 
the health and safety of children, this area has attracted an increasing amount 
of attention from both lawmakers and academic commentators.217  The 
previous sections of Part II examined the legislative response to the 
concussion epidemic.  Part II.D assesses the issue from an academic 
perspective.  In particular, Part II.D surveys the perspectives of three leading 
commentators:  Marie-France Wilson, Hosea H. Harvey, and Kerri 
McGowan Lowrey.  It is important to differentiate between primary risks, the 
root causes of TBI, and secondary risks, the effects after TBI.218  This is a 
distinction that Wilson, Harvey, and Lowrey each emphasize in their analyses 
of existing youth concussion legislation. 
Marie-France Wilson contends that while state youth concussion 
legislation is a positive development, it is not a complete answer to the 
problem, because, at best, such measures can only reduce, not eliminate, 
sports-related TBIs.219  In response to the ongoing issue, Wilson encourages 
a “trickle-down effect,” where policies adopted at professional levels 
influence those intended to protect young athletes.220  For example, Wilson 
points to rule changesspecifically rules regarding body checking in ice 
hockeyas preventative measures that can potentially reduce the incidence 
of concussions.221  In 2010, in response to growing concerns about TBIs, the 
National Hockey League (NHL) implemented new rules that prohibited hits 
to the head.222  Subsequently, due to growing concerns on the part of the 
NHL and new scientific studies that pointed to the dangers of body checking 
at a young age, the Canadian Academy of Sports Medicine and the American 
Academy of Pediatrics recommended limits on body checking at the youth 
level.223  Therefore, changes in behavior and attitudes toward concussions at 
the youth level may be fostered by similar changes at the professional 
level.224 
While Wilson focuses mainly on the primary prevention of TBIs through 
rule changes and subsequent behavioral changes, she also recommends 
certain secondary measures aimed at protecting youth athletes after they have 
suffered a concussion.225  In light of the “patch-work quilt” of reforms that 
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have been set forth across state lines, Wilson calls for a uniform set of 
guidelinesproposed by a panel of medical expertsmandated by federal 
and state legislation.226  The absence of such guidelines, to date, is 
representative of the failure of legislatures and national sports governing 
bodies to adequately address the threats posed by sports-related TBIs.227  
Moving forward, a uniform set of guidelines would raise the standard of care 
provided to youth athletes,228 help medical professionals avoid liability,229 
and heighten awareness concerning the risk of youth concussions.230  In turn, 
professional sports leagues should endorse these uniform guidelines to 
encourage their adoption.231 
Like Wilson, Hosea H. Harvey also distinguishes between primary and 
secondary risks.  Harvey argues that existing youth concussion legislation 
has been shaped by a dominant interest group with questionable motives, the 
NFL; thus, existing youth TBI laws overemphasize prevention of secondary 
rather than primary prevention.232  As a result, Harvey believes that current 
state laws will likely fail to significantly reduce the overall rate of TBIs in 
youth sports.233  According to Harvey, alternative policy and public health 
measures may offer more meaningful solutions.234  Specifically, Harvey calls 
for direct interventions in particular sportsincluding equipment 
improvements and rule changesand emphasizes the importance of policies 
created by professional and independent associations.235  Despite his 
criticism of the NFL, Harvey points to specific rule changes implemented by 
the league in 2011 and 2013 that were specifically intended to reduce 
TBIs.236  Pop Warner subsequently crafted new policies to limit contact 
during football practices and increase concussion awareness among 
participants.237  According to Harvey, state legislatures should not ignore the 
policies created by independent associations like Pop Warner.238 
 
 226. Id. at 257, 291; see also Taylor Adams, Comment, The Repercussions of Concussions 
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In addition to implementing primary prevention measures, Harvey also 
calls for improved procedures to reduce the secondary risks of TBI.  Here, 
Harvey encourages states to implement measures to allow them to better 
evaluate the effectiveness of their laws:  baseline testing, mandatory tracking 
of individual students, and aggregate reporting of data.239  Harvey 
acknowledges that, absent partnerships with the CDC and universities, the 
financial burden of these reforms is daunting for increasingly cost-conscious 
states.240  Thus, Harvey suggests two alternative measures.  First, states 
should adopt anonymous reporting systems so that parents, athletes, and other 
officials can blow the whistle when TBI-prevention mandates are not being 
followed.241  Second, and perhaps most crucially, states must break free from 
the NFL’s regulatory capture and engage in independent legislative 
debates.242 
Like Harvey, Kerri McGowan Lowrey asserts that state legislatures should 
continue to expand the protections offered to youth athletes by strengthening 
existing legislation.  Lowrey emphasizes that many states have revised their 
laws since initial passage and that these amendments are leading indicators 
of future policymaking.243  Lowrey argues that as policymaking continues 
the trend of increasing protections, state legislatures should take aim at 
improving both primary and secondary prevention.244  Changes to existing 
laws have focused on expanding coverage to private recreational sports and 
tightening existing requirements according to best practices.245  Moving 
forward, states that have not already undertaken these measures will likely 
expand the reach of their laws to include recreational youth sports and school-
based athletics in middle and elementary schools.246  In addition, as state 
legislatures learn lessons from implementation and new research 
developments, many states will likely strengthen the specific protections 
within their existing statutes.247 
While these measures will help reduce the secondary risks of TBI, Lowrey 
argues that “perhaps the most promising development is the emphasis on 
primary prevention” through safer rules of play, mandated limits on physical 
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contact, and further regulating sporting equipment.248  For instance, 
Massachusetts law prohibits coaches from encouraging or allowing a youth 
athlete to engage in unreasonably dangerous techniques, such as helmet-to-
helmet hits in football.249  In addition, the California State Legislature has 
limited full-contact football practices to twice per week and has stipulated 
that the full-contact portion of a practice cannot exceed ninety minutes in a 
given day.250  Finally, Texas laws now establish age and reconditioning 
standards for helmets in school football programs.251  With respect to these 
primary prevention initiatives, Lowrey encourages other states to follow 
suit.252 
III.  FUTURE POLICYMAKING:  
CONFRONTING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 
BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER IMPACT 
As Part II discussed, existing youth sports concussion legislation tends to 
focus on reducing the secondary effects of concussions after the injury has 
already occurred rather than addressing the primary risks, the root causes of 
the injury.253  This has occurred, in part, due to lobbying and regulatory 
capture by the NFL.254  To adequately protect youth athletes, legislation must 
target both risks.  Primary prevention of at least some injuries is possible via 
the modification of existing rules of play and subsequent changes in attitudes 
and behaviors.255  Improved secondary prevention, on the other hand, is 
attainable through enhanced TBI assessment and management.256 
This part argues that state legislatures have provided a useful framework 
to begin addressing the concussion epidemic, but the existing framework 
does not represent the end goal.  Part III.A asserts that to enhance protections 
for all children, legislation in all states requires increased policy innovation, 
stronger enforcement mechanisms, and more evaluative metrics at the state 
level.  Next, Part III.B concludes that beyond just addressing the ex post 
effects of TBI, additional legislative mandates are required to address the 
problem ex ante:  future efforts should place greater emphasis on preventing 
the initial injury.  Based on these recommendations, Part III.C suggests 
provisions to be included in a new model statute.  Finally, Part III.D briefly 
notes that the adoption of a new model statute will require incentivizing state 
legislatures to act. 
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A.  Addressing Secondary Risks:  
Confronting the Issue After Impact 
The Lystedt Law defined the problem of youth concussions in a very 
narrow manner.  The statute emphasized return-to-play guidelines only after 
a concussion occurs.257  As a result, the basic tenets of the law underscored 
the importance of secondary prevention measures but remained silent on the 
issue of primary prevention.258  Moving forward, state legislatures must 
begin to address these primary risks.  However, it is also important that state 
laws continue to expand the scope of secondary measures.259  More 
specifically, future lawmaking should broaden the scope of coverage to 
include all youth athletes, strengthen enforcement mechanisms, and enact 
feedback procedures for states to assess the effectiveness of their statutes. 
1.  Expanding Coverage and Strengthening Enforcement 
By merely emulating the Lystedt Law, many state legislatures have failed 
to innovate in the protections they provide to youth athletes.260  However, in 
the post-Lystedt Law era of reform, all youth athletes should be protected, 
not just those in public high schools.261  States should explicitly expand the 
reach of their laws to cover recreational (nonschool-based) youth sports and 
athletics in both middle and elementary schools.262  Some states have already 
begun to expand their coverage.  For example, California has expanded 
coverage to charter and private schools,263 Indiana and Virginia to sports 
organizations using school property,264 and Arkansas to all recreational youth 
sports.265  Other states should continue to follow this trend. 
In addition to expanding coverage, states must begin to strengthen 
enforcement mechanisms.266  Even the most well-written statute is 
meaningless if it is not enforced.267  In this sense, state statutes should specify 
sanctions that will be imposed for school districts and coaches that fail to 
comply with state laws.268  Cost-efficient yet effective sanctions could 
include forfeiture of games, reduction of practice time, or suspension of 
programs.269  In addition, an extra layer of enforcement should be added in 
the form of anonymous reporting systems, modeled after whistleblower 
provisions in other laws.270  This provision would allow parents, athletes, and 
 
 257. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 258. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 259. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 260. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 261. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 263. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (West 2016). 
 264. IND. CODE § 20-34-7-1.5 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-271.5 (2017). 
 265. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-710 (2017). 
 266. See supra Part II.B. 
 267. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 269. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 14, at 288. 
 270. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.  Each provisionthe former 
appearing in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the latter 
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other interested parties to share information when coaches or health-care 
providers do not adhere to the state’s TBI-prevention mandate.271 
2.  Reporting and Feedback Procedures 
Once state legislatures expand their laws to give them teeth through 
enforcement mechanisms, it is essential that states have tools in place to 
evaluate the laws’ effectiveness.272  To determine whether the law is actually 
effective, states must track the concussion history of individual athletes and 
analyze this data;273 this type of analysis is imperative in any broad public 
health initiative.  The Vermont General Assembly has provided a model by 
requiring the Vermont Traumatic Brain Injury Advisory Board to obtain 
information necessary to create an annual report on the incidences of 
concussions sustained by student athletes in Vermont in the previous school 
year.274  Yet most other states have not taken this initiative, likely due to the 
high costs associated with implementing such a procedure.275  Assuming that 
cost is a barrier for many states,276 the CDC, which has begun to implement 
similar tracking measures at the national level,277 should be tasked with 
developing and implementing a national surveillance system.  According to 
the CDC, improved tracking can help establish more precise methods for TBI 
diagnosis, improve outcome assessment, and compare the effectiveness and 
costs of tests, treatments, and services.278 
States should also develop procedures that require all youth athletes to 
undergo baseline testing before the start of a new season.279  The individual 
baseline produced by such testing would be used during the season to 
determine whether a player’s cognitive functioning deviates from the 
preseason norm.280  Thus, youth athletes would not be permitted to return to 
play until their cognitive functioning returns to their preseason baseline; if 
used properly, the risk of second impact syndrome would be greatly 
reduced.281 
The obvious drawback of baseline testing is its cost.282  The Federal 
ConTACT Act,283 if it had passed, would have required computerized testing, 
similar to ImPACT testing,284 for school-aged children, which would have 
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been funded with federal grants.285  In light of this bill’s failure, wealthier 
schools have begun to fund baseline initiatives;286 however, in many other 
school districts, especially those in rural areas where funding is severely 
limited, there are no such initiatives.287  This is where Congress and state 
legislatures should step in.  The federal government, particularly executive 
agencies like Health and Human Services or the Department of Education, 
should demand increased funding to ensure the safety of youth athletes,288 a 
relatively nonpartisan issue.  In addition, state legislators can pursue 
alternative sources of capital, such as partnerships with universities and 
corporate donors.289  New Jersey, for example, has developed a particularly 
innovative statutory solution.290  The statute applies a small surcharge (fifty 
cents) to car registration fees, which is used to pay for the baseline testing of 
high school athletes.291  Overall, while the cost of baseline testing is certainly 
a concern, it is outweighed when viewed in comparison to the lifelong 
injuries that the testing is designed to prevent.292 
Finally, state legislatures should more clearly define when tort liability is 
an available remedy because silence on this issue creates confusion among 
courts, parents, and coaches.293  Such confusion is problematic because it has 
potentially devastating consequences for youth athletes.294  States should be 
left to choose the level of protection offered to various actors.  While some 
may choose a more liberal approach in allowing negligence claims, others 
may decline to allow suit absent willful misconduct or gross negligence.295  
At a minimum, state legislatures should expressly address this issue.296  
Moreover, the issue of liability also arises when teams compete against other 
teams in a different state.297  In this scenario, to prevent confusion, Congress 
should provide a straightforward solution:  teams should be required to abide 
by the laws of their home state without regard to the state in which the teams 
are competing.298 
 
minute test to measure an athlete’s verbal and visual memory, reaction time, and processing 
speed. Id.  It can be used throughout the season to conduct subsequent tests that are then 
compared to the injured athlete’s baseline data. Id. 
 285. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 286. See Brandwein, supra note 75, at 53–55. 
 287. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 498. 
 288. See Brandwein, supra note 75, at 30. 
 289. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 107. 
 290. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:40-41.7 (West 2017). 
 291. Id. § 39:3-8.2(1)(b). 
 292. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 489–90. 
 293. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra Part II.B.2–3. 
 295. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 501. 
 296. See id. 
 297. See id. at 500. 
 298. See id. 
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B.  Addressing Primary Risks:  
Confronting the Issue Before Impact 
The most important goal that legislators should address is the prevention 
of initial injury.  For example, legislative mandates about how certain sports 
must be played would almost certainly drive down concussion rates.299  To 
date, legislators have largely avoided this form of intervention due, in part, 
to lobbying by the NFL and the potential public backlash that might 
accompany an alteration of a sport’s core nature.300  Moreover, certain 
obstacles have continued to obstruct comprehensive reform.  First, there is a 
longstanding culture within sports that promotes playing through injury.301  
Second, there is a widely held view that the traditional rules of sports are 
essential and must remain unchanged.302  Third, there is an enduring belief 
that governments should maintain a “hands-off” approach to regulating 
sports.303  Through the enactment of laws in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia, states have begun to overcome this third hurdle, particularly with 
regard to youth sports.304  Yet the first two hurdles remain.  As a result, future 
laws should emphasize specific rule changes and aim to change existing 
attitudes and behaviors. 
1.  Rule Changes 
While professional sports leagues have begun penalizing certain head-
impacting maneuvers,305 there are still other interventions that would likely 
reduce the risks of TBI.306  For instance, certain rule changes based on 
epidemiologic data “have reduced concussion and neck injury in some sports:  
 
 299. See CDC, HEADS UP, supra note 26. 
 300. See supra notes 134, 232 and accompanying text. 
 301. See Koller, supra note 154, at 723. 
 302. See id. at 729–30. 
 303. See id. at 687–88. 
 304. See id. at 738–39 (noting that “schools should receive the least insulation from 
government involvement”). 
 305. In 2010, the NFL implemented two new rules:  First, any player who launches himself 
off the ground and uses his helmet to strike a player in a defenseless posture in the head or 
neck will be penalized.  Second, when a player loses his helmet during the course of a play, 
the play will be immediately whistled dead. New NFL Rules Designed to Limit Head Injuries, 
NFL (July 26, 2012, 8:52 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81990bdf/article/ 
new-nfl-rules-designed-to-limit-head-injuries [https://perma.cc/S9Y6-A74R].  The following 
year, the NFL implemented further measures, including changes that have reduced the number 
of kickoff returns, because athletes involved in these plays have a four times greater risk of 
sustaining concussions than athletes involved in a running or passing play. See Harmon et al., 
supra note 67, at 5; Jarrett Bell, New NFL Kickoff Rule Could Be Game-Changer, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 8, 2011, 9:40 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/SPORTS/usaedition/2011-09-09-
Cover-NFL-kickoff-rule_CV_U.htm [https://perma.cc/3PFV-945U].  Similarly, in 2011, the 
NHL introduced a new rule that aimed to curtail blows to the head. See Jeff Z. Klein, With 
Stricter Rule on Hits to the Head, Some N.H.L. Stars Are Split on a Full Ban, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/sports/hockey/nhls-top-stars-weigh-in-
on-hits-to-the-head.html [https://perma.cc/8GGJ-UA5X].  The new rule gave referees wider 
discretion to call penalties for hits to the headregardless of the direction from which the hit 
was deliveredand afforded the league greater authority to mete out stiffer suspensions for 
egregious violations. Id. 
 306. See supra Part II.D. 
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1) banning ‘spear tackling’ in American football, 2) enforcing no ‘checking 
from behind’ in ice hockey, and 3) limiting ‘elbow to head’ contact in 
soccer.”307  However, it remains an “unfortunate fact” that rule changes at 
the amateur sports level often follow changes first made at the professional 
level.308  Moreover, it has been easier for lawmakers to focus on secondary 
interventions where the “core nature” of sports themselves is not directly 
threatened.309 
Moving forward, state legislatures should not wait for professional sports 
leagues to act; rather, they should directly intervene in particular youth 
sports, including football, ice hockey, and soccer.310  This type of legislation 
would not require legislatures to reinvent the wheel, as many rule changes 
have already been proposed by national sports governing bodies.311  
Specifically, state legislatures should adopt the rule changes set forth by USA 
Football, USA Hockey, and U.S. Soccerwhere they have not been adopted 
alreadyso that they gain the force of law.312  In addition, state legislatures 
should place limits on full-contact practices, both in terms of the techniques 
utilized and permissible time limits.313  For instance, state legislatures can 
follow California’s lead by limiting full-contact practices and placing time 
restrictions on the full-contact portion of daily practice.314  Here too, state 
legislatures can rely on other governing bodies as a guide.  In 2012, Pop 
Warner created standards to limit contact during football practices.315  
Furthermore, in 2016, Ivy League football coaches decided to eliminate all 
full-contact hitting practices during the regular season.316  While further 
studies are needed to evaluate the effects of reducing physical contact at 
 
 307. Harmon et al., supra note 67, at 13 (footnote omitted). 
 308. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 251 (“Unfortunate in the sense that the rules governing 
the conduct of sports at the professional level are not necessarily an appropriate model for the 
rules that should govern sports at the amateur level, particularly where young athletes are the 
participants.”). 
 309. Harvey, supra note 14, at 110. 
 310. See id. at 107. 
 311. In 2015, U.S. Soccer placed a ban on heading the ball for players ten years of age and 
under. U.S. Soccer Provides Additional Information About Upcoming Player Safety 
Campaign, U.S. SOCCER (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.ussoccer.com/stories/2015/11/09/22/57/ 
151109-ussoccer-provides-additional-information-about-upcoming-player-safety-campaign 
[https://perma.cc/T9HC-7Q49].  In 2011, USA Hockey banned body checking for players 
twelve years of age and under. See Lindsey Barton Straus, Body Checking Banned at Pee Wee 
Level, MOMSTEAM (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.momsteam.com/usa-hockey/usa-hockey-
consider-ban-body-checking-at-pee-wee-level [https://perma.cc/K64B-QHPH]. 
 312. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 222(d) (2017) (prohibiting coaches, trainers, and 
others from encouraging or permitting a student to engage in any “unreasonably dangerous 
athletic technique that unnecessarily endangers the health of a student, including using a 
helmet or any other sports equipment as a weapon” such as a helmet-to-helmet hit). 
 313. See CDC, HEADS UP, supra note 26. 
 314. See Lowrey, supra note 243, at 68. 
 315. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.  These regulations limit contact drills to 
one-third of practice time and ban full head-on blocking and tackling drills in which players 
line up more than three yards apart. Limited Contact in Practice, POP WARNER (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.popwarner.com/safety/practice_contact.htm [https://perma.cc/6H2N-7GB8]. 
 316. See Ken Belson, Ivy League Moves to Eliminate Tackling at Football Practices, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/sports/ncaafootball/ivy-league-
moves-to-eliminate-tackling-at-practices.html [https://perma.cc/29QG-V74Q]. 
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practice,317 one study has already suggested that such rules have succeeded 
in reducing concussion rates among youth athletes.318 
2.  Changes in Attitudes and Behaviors 
While state legislatures have the power to propose and enact legislation 
relatively quickly, changing societal attitudes and behaviors is a more gradual 
process.319  President Barack Obama addressed this issue:  “[W]e need more 
athletes to understand how important it is to do what we can to prevent 
injuries and to admit them when they do happen.  We have to change a culture 
that says you suck it up.”320  Much of this change should be driven by state 
legislation, which aims to educate coaches and youth athletes on the dangers 
of TBI.321  However, professional sports leagues can also fuel this cultural 
shift.322  If professional leagues and athletes become more proactive and 
candid about the seriousness of TBI, this may facilitate a change in behavior 
among amateur leagues and youth athletes, given that changes by 
professional leagues tend to be followed at amateur levels.323  A more in-
depth discussion of actions to be taken by professional sports leagues is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  However, short-term changesin the form 
of state legislationwill likely lead to longer-term and more permanent 
changes in attitudes and behaviors.324 
C.  The Model Statute:  A New Benchmark 
The burden is on state legislatures to adequately address both the primary 
and secondary risks of TBI among youth athletes.325  Up to this point, most 
states have looked to Washington’s Lystedt Law as a model statute.326  
However, moving forward, state legislatures should amend their youth 
 
 317. See, e.g., 2014 Conn. Acts 14-66 (Reg. Sess.) (tabling an enacted version of the bill 
pending further study of this issue before signing the bill into law). 
 318. See Timothy A. McGuine et al., Effect of New Rule Limiting Full Contact Practice on 
Incidence of Sport Related Concussion in High School Football Players, AM. ACAD. 
PEDIATRICS (Oct. 24, 2015, 2:50 PM), http://aap.confex.com/aap/2015/webprogram/ 
Paper31701.html [https://perma.cc/9STE-8387]. 
 319. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 253–54. 
 320. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Healthy Kids and Safe 
Sports Concussion Summit (May 29, 2014, 11:19 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/05/29/remarks-president-healthy-kids-and-safe-sports-concussion-summit 
[https://perma.cc/T89H-93Y9]. 
 321. See Koller, supra note 154, at 721–23. 
 322. For example, in 2013, the “Heads Up Football” initiative was introduced, with 
financial backing from the NFL and oversight provided by USA Football. See Alan Schwarz, 
N.F.L.-Backed Youth Program Says It Reduced Concussions.  The Data Disagrees., N.Y. 
TIMES (July 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/sports/football/nfl-concussions-
youth-program-heads-up-football.html [https://perma.cc/XB3Z-L5HA].  The program 
provides a series of in-person and online courses for coaches to learn better safety procedures 
and proper tackling drills. Id. 
 323. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 251. 
 324. See Koller, supra note 154, at 722. 
 325. See supra Part III.A–B. 
 326. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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concussion statutes to incorporate the following provisions.  Each state 
statute should 
(1)  clearly define the statute’s purposeto protect all youth athletes both 
before and after an injury occurs;327 
(2)  expressly expand coverage to include private recreational sports;328 
(3)  strengthen the education tenet by requiring all coaches to complete 
annual concussion-specific training;329 
(4)  require written medical clearance from a licensed health-care provider 
trained in the evaluation and management of concussions before a 
youth athlete can return to play;330 
(5)  require the state’s department of health, or a subdivision thereof, to 
establish an anonymous hotline that allows interested stakeholders to 
report instances where they believe the statute has been violated;331 
(6)  require the state’s department of health, or a subdivision thereof, to 
provide baseline testing to all youth athletes on an annual basis;332 
(7)  apply a small surcharge to car registration fees, whereby 100 percent 
of the proceeds are used to fund baseline testing;333 
(8)  impose sanctionsspecifically the penalties that have been 
implemented in Pennsylvaniaon coaches who fail to satisfy the 
statutory mandate;334 and 
(9)  expressly address the issue of civil liability, specifically that coaches, 
officials, and volunteers are immune from civil liability unless their 
action or inaction constitutes gross negligence or willful 
misconduct.335 
D.  The Next Step:  Incentivizing State Legislatures 
to Adopt the New Benchmark 
Now that all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted some 
form of youth sports concussion legislation,336 state legislatures should 
examine whether these laws offer adequate protections to youth athletes.  
Most state statutes, as currently constituted, are inadequate.337  However, 
rather than depending on state legislatures to act of their own accord, large 
institutional actorssuch as the CDC and sports governing bodiesshould 
incentivize states to update and strengthen their laws.  The intricacies of these 
incentives or lobbying efforts are beyond the purview of this Note.  
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the fact that, while this Note 
provides an analysis of existing state laws and recommends provisions that 
should be included in all state statutes, this is by no means the end of the 
 
 327. See supra Part III.A–B. 
 328. See supra notes 115, 117 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 241, 270 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra notes 290–92 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra notes 295–96 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra Part III.A–B. 
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discussion.  Further research, analysis, and commentary are needed to ensure 
that all youth athletes are adequately protected. 
CONCLUSION 
Increasing awareness of the causes and effects of youth TBI presents a dual 
responsibility for legislators and regulators:  on the one hand, it creates the 
need to assess and manage TBIs after they have occurred, and on the other, 
the epidemic demands a solution for preventing TBI in the first instance.  
Although state legislatures have begun to address the former, they have failed 
to address the latter.  In light of this epidemic, this Note surveys the current 
landscape of state legislation and categorizes the existing state laws into tiers 
based on the strength of protections that each tier offers to youth athletes.  
While Washington State has provided a decent starting point, other state 
legislatures must continue to innovate in terms of the safeguards they 
provide.  By placing states into tiers, this Note challenges state legislatures 
that currently lag behind leading states to draw inspiration from statutes 
within the Leaders tier.  Moreover, by recommending certain statutory 
provisions within an updated model statute, this Note also provides states 
within the Leaders tier with a concrete goal to which they should aspire. 
In response to current inadequate legislation, states should adopt the model 
statutory provisions discussed in Part III.C, which target both the primary and 
secondary risks of youth concussions.  The provisions of this new model offer 
greater protections than the existing benchmark, Washington’s Lystedt Law, 
in that they expand coverage and require specific feedback mechanisms.  
State legislatures should amend their youth sports concussion laws to match 
the provisions of the updated benchmark.  State legislatures should also 
expand the scope of their youth sports concussion laws to ensure that all 
children receive adequate protections.   
Once Zackery Lystedt began to clutch the sides of his helmet, writhing in 
pain, he should have been removed from the game and prevented from 
reentering until he received written medical clearance from a trained health-
care professional.  But that alone is not a solution.  A more comprehensive 
resolution, such as the one advanced by this Note, provides greater 
protections for children like Zackery, both before and after they run onto the 
playing surface. 
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APPENDIX:  A TIERED APPROACH 
 
Tier (# of Statutes) Characterization Statutes 
Laggards (4) No requirement of 
written clearance 
GA, ID, MS, WY 
 
Loafers (7) Weak education tenets CO, MN, MO, NH, 
NY, SC, UT
Lystedters (14) Match the three basic 
Lystedt tenets, but fail to 
innovate beyond these 
three requirements
AK, AZ, CA, DC, FL, 
IA, KS, NC, NE, NV, 
OK, VA, WA, WI  
Lystedters-Plus (16) Training of coaches is 
expressly required, 
rather than suggested 
CT, DE, HI, KY, MA, 
ME, MT, ND, NJ, 
NM, PA, RI, SD, TX, 
VT, WV
Leaders (10) Reach youth athletes in 
both public schools and 
private recreational 
sports
AL, AR, IL, IN, LA, 
MD, MI, OH, OR, TN 
 
